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say, its negative condition is not met. Causality reigns. Compatibilists 
allow for freedom if the causes at issue are within the agent. But that 
proviso strikes libertarians (and others) as empty. Still, what are we to 
make of actions that are "authored" by a libertarian self both metaphysi-
cally and historically unimaginable? 
For Pinckaers, we become free. We do so in becoming free from what 
impedes the cooperation of reason and will and thus free for the good 
which attracts us. So we are neither determinists nor libertarians. But 
are we compatibilists? Surely not in a Humean sense; perhaps not in 
any sense. What, then, is the Christian view in the modern context? 
How do we engage the established disorder if our identity is unclear? 
La lotta continua. 
Faith and Criticism, by Basil Mitchell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Pp.173. $29.95 (Cloth) 
WILLIAM P. ALSTON, Syracuse University 
The central problem dealt with in this book is whether openness to criti-
cism is compatible with the strong commitment essential to religious 
faith. Mitchell approaches the problem by contrasting what he calls lib-
erals and conservatives in theology. Evincing keen awareness of the ambi-
guity of these terms, he stipulates the following understanding . 
. .. within all the mainstream churches there is a sharp division 
between those who take it for granted that Christian theology 
should be studied critically with the aid of all the resources of 
modern scholarship and with due attention to all that is received 
as knowledge in the modern world [liberals], and those who 
resist this trend as destructive of the historic faith of Christians 
[conservatives] (1) 
Mitchell's presentation of this contrast is notable for bringing out the 
way in which fundamentalists and radical thinkers like D. Z. Phillips 
share a rejection of the possibility that extra-religious knowledge could 
overthrow Christian faith, despite their very different versions of this 
conviction. 
The central issue of the book then emerges from a conservative criti-
cism of liberal theology. 
Christian faith is unconditional. It demands our complete and 
whole-hearted allegiance. But to allow Christian belief to be 
exposed to criticism implies that criticism might turn out to be 
fatal. Once it is allowed that faith is, in principle, vulnerable to 
criticism, its character is bound to change. In place of the total 
commitment which is demanded of Christians we have a faith 
which is tentative and provisional. (4) 
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Though Mitchell takes this argument very seriously, and points out that 
the difficulty arises within liberal theology itself (since the liberal is also 
concerned to defend the faith), he is primarily concerned to rebut this 
alleged incompatibility of full-blooded faith and openness to criticism. 
His most crucial move is a challenge to the antithesis of faith and 
rationality that is presupposed in the above argument. "My claim will 
be that faith, far from being the antithesis of rationality, is an essential 
requirement of any kind of effective intellectual endeavour." (10) He 
begins his defense of this claim by alluding to John Henry Newman's 
critique of Locke's conception of reason as the proportioning of belief to 
the evidence. Though he gives a fine exposition of several of Newman's 
points, the one on which he lays most emphasis is the following. 
If our appreciation of evidence and our assessment of the con-
clusions that follow from it is generally tacit and implicit, and if 
the process of reasoning is conducted within a framework of 
assumptions which are to some extent influenced by the indi-
vidual's entire character and personality, a certain stability over 
time in these assumptions is necessary. 
In this connection he cites the stress people like Thomas Kuhn have put 
on the point that science would be impossible if hypotheses and theories 
were rejected every time some contrary evidence turns up. "Hence, sci-
entists operate with what has been called a 'principle of tenacity', in 
virtue of which they do not let go of their fundamental beliefs when 
things get difficult, but rather persevere in the hope, or - shall we say? -
the faith, that the problem will eventually be resolved." (18) And he 
goes on to suggest that this tenacity is even more marked and more 
important in the human sciences and in the humanities than in the phys-
ical sciences about which Kuhn was speaking. Moreover, " .. .it is even 
more obviously true of world-views or philosophies of life .... For these 
are not only practical, but also comprehensive." (27) In addition, they 
involve not only the pursuit of truth but also the search for salvation, 
where the need for continuity and stability of one's basic principles and 
orientation are still more central desiderata. 
Thus Mitchell's basic line is that the need for a balance between 
unconditional commitment and openness to criticism is not at all pecu-
liar to religious faith, but is a pervasive feature of our intellectual and 
practical life. But since he is plumping for a balance, he is careful not to 
stress the value of stability to the exclusion of testing against knowledge 
and experience. 
These results can, of course, be straighforwardly applied to the case of 
Christian faith, and to religious faith more generally. Yet in Chapter 3, 
"Faith and Criticism as Interdependent," Mitchell give careful consider-
ation to ways in which the religious case is, or might be thought to be, 
special. Thus the conservative "may argue that Christian faith demands 
an altogether greater degree of commitment to a particular historical tra-
dition than is required by these secular analogies." (51) "Christian faith 
cannot be a purely individual matter but involves sharing the creed of 
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the Christian Church; and the Church itself accepts the authority of the 
Scriptures and of the Christian tradition more definitely and more for-
mally than is the case with these secular counterparts." (52). Mitchell's 
response to this is two-pronged, and it is initially unclear just how he 
takes the two prongs to be related. (1) He points out that genuine 
Christian faith is not "simply repeating what is said in the Bible without 
any attempt to understand it". (54) It rather involves "a process of sub-
ordinating some parts of the Bible to others".(55) Moreover, "we ought 
surely to expect that God's truth will transcend our understanding at 
any particular time and indeed prove inexhaustible." (55) Such consid-
erations lead him to the conclusion that "the conservative's emphasis on 
the primacy of divine revelation and the distinctive character of faith in 
it does not detract from the liberal's insistence upon the need for criti-
cism. Rather the two are interdependent. Criticism, to have any point, 
requires a strong tradition whose claims to truth are seriously advanced 
and will not readily be surrendered. Faith requires that the tradition 
which is being upheld should be tested in the fires of criticism." (63) "It 
is only by exposure to criticism that the full implications of our faith can 
be increasingly understood, and it belongs to that faith to trust that it 
can withstand criticism and be illuminated by it." (64). 
(2) The second prong involves the distinction between faith as 
"believing that" and faith as "trusting reliance upon God". It is in this 
second sense, he says "that faith is indeed unconditional. As Christians, 
we are bound to maintain our trust in God's goodness and mercy no 
matter what dangers and difficulties confront us." (65). 
But though these points look quite different, Mitchell relates them as 
follows . 
.. , the unconditional nature of our trust in God, of our faith in 
him in that sense, does have a bearing on the nature of our belief 
in him, in the sense of 'belief that', and our willingness to expose 
it to criticism. For it assumes that all truth is God's truth and 
that, if we are honest in our search for truth and at the same 
time loyal to the signs we have been given, we shall not ulti-
mately be misled .... Those of us who are, in the sense I have 
given the word, liberals in theology are, I think, entitled to ask 
which attitude shows the greater trust in God, that which refus-
es to submit our traditional formulations of belief to criticism, or 
that which is confident that, if we put them to the test of reason 
and experience, we shall be led in the end to a fuller under-
standing of them, and a firmer conviction of their truth. (66) 
Thus the unconditional trust in God can lead us to the interdependence 
of (propositional) faith and criticism we found in the first prong. 
The above takes us through only three of the eight chapters of the 
book, but they are the ones that contain Mitchell's answer to what he 
highlights as his basic problem. In the remainder we find insightful 
comments on various subsidiary issues. In Ch. 4 the author casts war-
ranted aspersions on the idea that Hume and Kant have put the quietus 
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on giving significant reasons for Christian belief, construed as making 
factual claims - natural or supernatural. In Ch. 5 he addresses what he 
terms a "secondary theme for this book", "an inevitable tension between 
those who want above all to hold fast to traditional beliefs and make 
sure that nothing of value is lost even at the risk of a clash with 'modern 
knowledge'; and those who want above all to proclaim a faith that is rel-
evant to our times even at the risk of sacrificing some elements of tradi-
tional doctrine". (88) Mitchell declares that "Both emphases are neces-
sary and it is a tragedy for the Church that the two should so often be in 
uncomprehending conflict" (88), a sentiment as appropriate to 
American mainline denominations as to the Church of England. In 
arguing that the two emphases are compatible Mitchell declares his faith 
"that the Christian tradition embodies a message of such a kind that it 
can retain its identity while subject to revision in the light of developing 
knowledge". (91) In developing this idea he evinces a keen sensitivity 
to the difficulties of striking the right balance, but he steadfastly main-
tains that the attempt to do so is eminently worthwhile. Thus, in com-
menting on the aversion of "progressives" to biblical fundamentalism, 
he suggests a middle position. 
It might be the case that, although the New Testament does not 
contain a set of entirely consistent teachings, ready-made, so to 
speak, it does nevertheless possess an overall coherence which 
becomes steadily more apparent the more it is studied and med-
itated upon .. .it would not, indeed, be possible for Christian 
thinkers at any given time in history to predict just how a partic-
ular doctrine would be interpreted, and rightly interpreted, at 
some future period, but it would be possible to distinguish, at 
that later period, between what was a genuine development of 
the original message and what was a corruption or dilution of 
it.. .of course there is no simple set of rules by which such a dis-
crimination can be made, and in that sense, there is no guaran-
tee of correctness ... but, as we have seen, the same is true in any 
important sphere of human enquiry. (93-94) 
This is then followed by an acute criticism of the conceptual relativism 
according to which people in one period are unable to so much as 
understand what those of another period are saying. 
The last three chapters apply the foregoing discussion to increasingly 
concrete and practical concerns - ethics, religious education, and the 
place of the established church in Britain. 
What are we to say of all this? I must confess that Mitchell's treat-
ment is so judicious, so eminently sensible, so beautifully a specimen of 
the Anglican via media that this partisan of the via media can find little 
with which to seriously disagree. I will register only one significant 
reservation. The strength of the analogies Mitchell draws between reli-
gious belief and other belief systems, vis-a-vis the stability-openness 
contrast, is a function of the extent to which the the case for, e.g., tradi-
tional Christian belief is anything like as strong as the case for received 
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views in the sciences, the humanities, history, and the like. This is some-
thing Mitchell does not address in this book, though he has elsewhere, 
particularly in The Justification of Religious Belief. But we should realize 
that the issue lies just below the surface. 
Otherwise, one might complain that the middle ground he favors is 
often characterized too unspecifically to give much useful guidance. 
Where we find partisans of opposite extremes it is always plausible to 
suggest that there must be some mediating position that accommodates 
the valid insights of both sides while avoiding the excesses of each. But 
actually doing the job is another matter. I have quoted Mitchell as pre-
senting, on one or another issue, some suggestions as to the form a mid-
dle position might take, but one may be pardoned for wanting some 
more substantial working out of such a position. But such a reaction 
would amount to wishing the author had written another book instead. 
What Mitchell has set out to do in this book is to address fundamental 
questions concerning the relation of faith and criticism, not develop a 
formulation of the faith that results from the actual deployment of such 
criticism. This is, if you like, meta-critical faith, not the first-level article. 
As with all meta-inquiries, many will be dissatisfied with the level of 
abstractness it exhibits. But long philosophical experience clearly indi-
cates that meta-investigations can guide and illuminate first level work 
in the trenches. So let us be thankful for the wise counsel contained in 
this book and profit from it when we undertake tasks of the sort upon 
which it is a reflection. 
Making Sense of Your Freedom: Philosophy for the Perplexed by James W. 
Felt. S.J. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv and 110. 
$28.95 (cloth); $9.95 (paper). 
EDWARD POLS, Bowdoin College 
Professor Felt's work is a remarkably clear and sometimes brilliant exer-
cise in what William James called popular philosophy. James himself 
often wrote or lectured in that mode, and probably nowhere more bril-
liantly than in his "The Dilemma of Determinism," which Felt cites and 
quotes. Felt's book, in its clarity, wit, and the vividness of its concrete 
examples, reminds me of that side of James. But to speak of Making Sense 
of Your Freedom as an exercise in popular philosophy means only that it 
is not addressed solely to an audience of professional philosophers. The 
book is clearly the product of a subtle mind, one that has managed to 
say something striking about many aspects of this difficult and impor-
tant problem. The book has an admirable unity and pace, and it can be 
read with profit by professionals working in the fields of philosophy 
and religion. 
The freedom that interests Felt, he tells us in chapter 1, manifests itself 
in the very act of choosing: it is, he says, the "characteristic or quality of a 
human act, specifically of the interior act of deciding to respond in some 
